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I, Too, Am a Reasonable Man 
Abstract 
There has been an ongoing debate regarding police-on-Black violence 
since the dawn of the United States police force.  At every stage, the criminal 
justice system has had a monumental impact on the plight of the Black 
American community.  The historical roots of racism within the criminal 
justice system have had adverse effects on the Black American psyche.  
Emerging research suggests that the upsurge in reporting police-on-Black 
violence—including videos shot from pedestrian camera phones and 
uploaded to multimedia platforms and historical accounts of the 
agonizing treatment Black Americans have experienced beginning with 
Slave Patrols—has affected individualized behavior during interactions with 
police officers.  This is crucial because courts analyze an individual's 
behavior at the sight of or in the presence of police officers when deciding 
whether or not a police officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to 
stop an individual.  Courts consider an individual's nervous or evasive 
behavior as a factor in favor of finding a police officer had justifiable 
reasonable suspicion to perform a stop.  In doing so, courts use a race-
neutral approach, which undoubtedly discounts the Black American 
historical experience.  This race-neutral approach ignores the specific 
history of racism against Black Americans by failing to explore how the 
sordid history of racialized terror in the criminal justice system affects 
individualized behavior. 
This article explores how the Supreme Court's creation of the 
reasonable suspicion standard facilitates, justifies, and perpetuates 
police violence against Black Americans.  This article argues that this 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment enables officers to manifest 
implicit biases and target Black Americans with little or no justification.  
The result is the current state of affairs, including unwarranted racial 
disparities at every stage of the criminal justice process.  Accordingly, 
this article suggests that instead of using a race-neutral analysis of the 
law, the Supreme Court should recognize the significance of the Black 
experience in the United States and implement the use of race as a factor in 
analyzing whether or not an individual's behavior 
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expressed enough nervousness or evasiveness to constitute justifiable 
reasonable suspicion for a police officer to perform a stop. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
I, too, sing America. 
I am the darker brother.  
They send me to eat in the kitchen 
When company comes, 
But I laugh, 
And eat well, 
And grow strong. 
 
Tomorrow, 
I’ll be at the table 
When company comes. 
Nobody’ll dare 
Say to me, 




They’ll see how beautiful I am 
And be ashamed— 
I, too, am America.1 
 
People of color in the United States—specifically Black Americans—
have a profoundly unique relationship with the police force.2  Since its 
inception, the police force has been tasked with enforcing laws that 
significantly marginalize the Black American community.3  Foreseeably, this 
 
 1. Langston Hughes, I, Too (1926) as contained in David C. Ward, What Langston Hughes’ 
Powerful Poem “I, Too” Tells Us About America’s Past and Present, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Sept. 22, 
2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/what-langston-hughes-powerful-
poem-i-too-americas-past-present-180960552/.  
 2. See, e.g., Nikole Hannah-Jones, Taking Freedom: Yes, Black America Fears the Police.  
Here’s Why., PAC. STANDARD (May 8, 2018), https://psmag.com/social-justice/why-black-america-
fears-the-police.  
 3. See Segregation in the United States, HIST. (May 16, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/ 
black-history/segregation-united-states.  The police force was tasked with enforcing Black Codes, Jim 
Crow, segregation, etc.  See id.; see also Hannah-Jones, supra note 2 ( “Historically . . . the police 
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undertaking has caused a culture of skepticism, distrust, and fear of the police 
force amongst Black Americans.4  That very culture of skepticism, distrust, 
and fear is being perpetuated under current precedent—particularly the 
Supreme Court’s creation and assessment of Fourth Amendment “reasonable 
suspicion.”5  The Court created this intermediate level of suspicion in order to 
monitor initial encounters between police officers and citizens.6  
Unfortunately, this standard, along with implicit biases, has been a leading 
cause in perpetuating racial disparities in policing.7  Although the Court 
analyzes an individual’s behavior at the sight or in the presence of police 
officers (i.e., nervous or evasive behavior is a factor towards a police officer 
having justifiable, reasonable suspicion), the Court does not take into account 
the race of the individual and how that affects the individual’s behavior (i.e., 
experiences that cause the individual to act nervous or evasive).8  Instead, the 
Court administers a supposed “race-neutral” reasonable suspicion assessment 
evaluated in light of the “totality of the circumstances.”9 
The historical, social, and political context criminalizing Black 
Americans has adversely affected the Black American psyche.10  This is 
especially true now at the height of multimedia platforms displaying and 
amplifying the racial disparities in policing, often using accounts and videos 
of excessive force victimizing Black Americans.11  Evidence suggests this 
media saturation of police-on-Black violence has caused many Black 
Americans to react in nervous or evasive ways in the presence of police, 
behaviors spawning not from a consciousness of guilt, but from the basic 
 
have defended and enforced racism and segregation—attacking civil rights protesters and disrupting 
strikes of black workers seeking to integrate workplaces and neighborhoods.”).  
 4. See Hannah-Jones, supra note 2. 
 5. See David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped 
and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 660 (1994). 
 6. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 7. See L. Song Richardson, Implicit Racial Bias and Racial Anxiety: Implications for Stops and 
Frisks, 15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 73, 83–84 (2017) (exploring the racial anxieties that police officers 
often exhibit when approaching Black Americans). 
 8. See infra Parts II, IV. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 7, at 87 (“For many Black individuals, the constant stopping, 
questioning, and frisking of individuals within their communities is perceived as harassment, and 
foments distrust, anger, and other feelings not conducive to fostering good community-police 
relationships or perceptions of police legitimacy.”); infra Part IV. 
 11. See John Eligon, Police Killings Have Harmed Mental Health in Black Communities, Study 
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2018) https://nyti.ms/2lp53eH. 
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human instincts of survival and self-preservation.12  To mitigate the significant 
racial disparities in policing that exist, this Comment proposes that the Court 
take race specifically into account under its totality of the circumstances 
analysis.13  This would create a more thorough review of the behavior 
factoring toward constituting “reasonable suspicion” and negate the inference 
of guilt that is associated with nervous or evasive behavior when pertaining to 
Black Americans.14  In adopting this standard, the Court would be adopting a 
true totality of the circumstances assessment, one that does not ignore race as 
a significant part of the whole picture.15 
Part II of this comment examines the history of the United States police 
force and its relationship with the Black American community.16  Part III 
examines the evolution of the reasonable suspicion standard.17  Part IV 
analyzes the impact of the Court’s “race-neutral” approach to the reasonable 
suspicion standard, its effects on racial disparities in policing, and its 
psychological consequences on the Black American psyche.18  Part V 
proposes that the Court adopt a true totality of the circumstances analysis and 
take race directly into account when assessing reasonable suspicion.19  Part VI 
forecasts the impact of the Court adopting this comment’s proposal to take 
race directly into account in the totality of the circumstances assessment.20  
Part VII concludes.21 
II. BLACK AMERICA AND THE POLICE FORCE: A DAUNTING HISTORY 
Both history and current affairs reveal that there has always been a rift 
between the police force and the Black American community.22  Since its 
inception, the police force has been delegated with the enforcement of laws 
 
 12. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text; infra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra Part V. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. See infra Part V. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Part III. 
 18. See infra Part IV. 
 19. See infra Part V. 
 20. See infra Part VI. 
 21. See infra Part VII. 
 22. See infra notes 25–45 and accompanying text. 
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that marginalize Black Americans.23  The police force enforced these laws 
harshly against Black Americans, creating and perpetuating a disconnect 
between the two.24 
In 1838, the city of Boston established the first organized, publicly funded 
police force.25  New York City and Chicago quickly followed, and “[b]y the 
1880s all major U.S. cities had municipal police forces in place.”26  The police 
forces in northern states, typically located in large shipping and commercial 
centers, were established to protect “property and safeguard the transport of 
goods.”27  However, the development of the American police force in southern 
states followed a very different path.28  Because the establishment of the police 
force was centered around protecting the economy, and the economy driving 
the southern states was the slavery system, “[t]he genesis of the modern police 
organization in the South [was] the ‘Slave Patrol.’”29 
[The southern] Slave Patrols had three primary functions: (1) to chase 
down, apprehend, and return to their owners, runaway slaves; (2) to 
provide a form of organized terror to deter slave revolts; and, (3) to 
maintain a form of discipline for slave-workers who were subject to 
summary justice, outside of the law, if they violated any plantation 
rules.30 
 
 23. See infra note 29 and accompanying text; see also ANGELA J. DAVIS ET AL., POLICING THE 
BLACK MAN, at xii (Angela J. Davis ed., Vintage Books 2018).  Davis states: 
From the arrival of the first slaves in Jamestown in 1619 to the lynchings of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries to the present day—black boys and men have been unlawfully 
killed by those who were sworn to uphold the law and by vigilantes who took the law into 
their own hands. 
Id. 
 24. See infra notes 25–45 and accompanying text. 
 25. Olivia B. Waxman, How the U.S. Got Its Police Force, TIME (May 18, 2017, 9:45 AM), 
https://time.com/4779112/police-history-origins/. 
 26. Id.; see also Gary Potter, The History of Policing in the United States, E. KY. U. POLICE STUD. 
(June 25, 2013), https://plsonline.eku.edu/insidelook/history-policing-united-states-part-1. 
 27. See Waxman, supra note 25; Potter, supra note 26. 
 28. See Potter, supra note 26. 
 29. Potter, supra note 26; see also Waxman, supra note 25. 
 30. Potter, supra note 26.  The Slave Patrol was a police force dedicated to enforcing the idea that 
Africans—or Negros—“were an uncivilized lesser race . . . lacking in intelligence and laudable human 
qualities” who “were defined as three-fifths of a man, not a real, whole human being.”  MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 1, 25–26 (2010).  These slave patrols were tasked with analogous 
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Following the American Civil War, these southern Slave Patrols evolved 
into more modern police departments.31  However, their purpose was 
largely unchanged, as they served primarily to control “freed slaves who 
were now laborers working in an agricultural caste system.”32  This 
modern police force functioned in a way that was analogous to the earlier 
Slave Patrols by enforcing the Black Codes, Jim Crow segregation laws, 
and the continuous disenfranchisement of the Black population.33 
Immediately following the Civil War, formerly enslaved people became 
subjected to what were known as Black Codes.34  The Black Codes limited 
how, when, and where Black Americans could work, dictated how much they 
would be paid, restricted their voting rights, dictated how and where they 
could travel, and limited where they could live and what type of property they 
could own.35  The police force was tasked with enforcing and surveilling 
Black Americans to ensure compliance with the Black Codes, and they did so 
harshly.36  Specifically, Black Americans who broke these laws were subject 
to arrests, beatings, and forced labor.37  In 1868, after three years of being 
subjected to this treatment, the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment 
made the Black Codes illegal by giving Black Americans the right to equal 
 
practices of the modern police force today: (1) to chase down and apprehend “criminals”; (2) to 
maintain public order and safety; and (3) to enforce the law and prevent, detect, and investigate 
criminal activities.  Cf. Hannah-Jones, supra note 2 (documenting personal accounts related to police 
efforts to detect crime, apprehend criminals, and maintain order). 
 31. See Chelsea Hansen, Slave Patrols: An Early Form of American Policing, NAT’L L. 
ENFORCEMENT MUSEUM (July 10, 2019), https://lawenforcementmuseum.org/2019/07/10/slave-
patrols-an-early-form-of-american-policing/. 
 32. Potter, supra note 26. 
 33. See Hansen, supra note 31 (“After the Civil War, Southern police departments often carried 
over aspects of the patrols . . . includ[ing] systematic surveillance, the enforcement of curfews, and 
even notions of who could become a police officer.”); Waxman, supra note 25; Potter, supra note 26. 
 34. See Black Codes, HIST. (June 1, 2010), https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/black-
codes.  Enacted by nearly all southern states in 1865 and 1866, the “black codes were restrictive laws 
designed to limit the freedom of [Black] Americans and ensure their availability as a cheap labor force 
after slavery was abolished.”  Id.; see also Connie Hassett-Walker, The Racist Roots of American 
Policing: From Slave Patrols to Traffic Stops, CHI. REP. (June 7, 2019), 
https://www.chicagoreporter.com/the-racist-roots-of-american-policing-from-slave-patrols-to-traffic-
stops/. 
 35. See Black Codes, supra note 34; Hassett-Walker, supra note 34. 
 36. See, e.g., Black Codes, supra note 34.  Under these codes, many southern states required Black 
Americans “to sign yearly labor contracts; if they refused, they risked being arrested, fined and forced 
into unpaid labor.”  Id. 
 37. See id. 
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protection of the laws under the Constitution.38 
Nevertheless, within two decades, segregation laws, better known as “Jim 
Crow laws,” were enacted across southern and some northern states.39  These 
laws subjugated Black Americans and denied their civil rights.40  For 
approximately eighty years, Jim Crow laws mandated the separation of public 
spaces for Black and White Americans, which included schools, elevators, 
restaurants, building entrances, water fountains, libraries, cemeteries, and 
cashier windows.41  Enforcing these laws was a key function of the police 
force, and Black Americans who violated social norms or broke those laws 
were often subjected to police brutality.42  At the same time, the police force 
did not punish the perpetrators when Black Americans were murdered by 
mobs, “[n]or did the judicial system hold the police accountable for failing to 
intervene,”43 despite the fact that lynchings were often held on courthouse 
lawns.44  Jim Crow laws were enforced until 1968, merely fifty-two years 
ago.45 
The history of the police force in America reveals that police officers have 
always been associated with the enforcement of laws that marginalize Black 
Americans.46  The Slave Patrol, Black Codes, and Jim Crow laws were 
precursors to the current state of affairs, including discriminatory criminal 
laws and the modern-day over-policing of Black Americans.47  While many 
other racial groups associate the police force in the United States with public 
 
 38. See Black Codes, supra note 34; Hassett-Walker, supra note 34. 
 39. See Black Codes, supra note 34; Hassett-Walker, supra note 34. 
 40. See Black Codes, supra note 34; Hassett-Walker, supra note 34. 
 41. See Jim Crow Laws, HIST. (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.history.com/topics/early-20th-
century-us/jim-crow-laws; Hassett-Walker, supra note 34. 
 42. See Hassett-Walker, supra note 34.  Black Americans who broke the Jim Crow segregation 
laws, including protestors, endured fire hoses, police dogs, bombings, and beatings by white mobs, as 
well as by the police.  See ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 37. 
 43. See Hassett-Walker, supra note 34. 
 44. SHERRILYN IFILL, ON THE COURTHOUSE LAWN: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF LYNCHING IN 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 8–9 (Beacon Press, 2007). 
 45. See Jim Crow Laws, supra note 41.  Often deemphasized is the proximity of the ending of the 
Jim Crow era to current times, as Jim Crow ended only fifty years ago.  Id.  Thus, many of the effects 
of Jim Crow are still fresh within the societal constructs of the police force as well as the minds of the 
American people.  Id. (“Jim Crow laws were technically off the books, though that has not always 
guaranteed full integration or adherence to anti-racism laws throughout the United States.”). 
 46. See supra notes 25–45 and accompanying text. 
 47. See Hassett-Walker, supra note 34 (“For the past five decades, the federal government has 
forbidden the use of racist regulations at the state and local level.  Yet people of color are still more 
likely to be killed by the police than whites.”); see also infra Section IV.A. 
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safety and welfare, for many Black Americans “law enforcement represents a 
legacy of reinforced inequality in the justice system and resistance to 
advancement—even under pressure from the civil rights movement and its 
legacy.”48  In the midst of the civil rights movement—a decade-long struggle 
by Black Americans to end legalized racial discrimination, 
disenfranchisement, and segregation in the United States enforced by the 
police force—the United States Supreme Court constructed the “reasonable 
suspicion” standard.49  This standard allows law enforcement officers to use 
their discretion to engage with “suspects” so long as they have reasonable and 
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.50  In practice, the 
reasonable suspicion standard has legitimized, legalized, and facilitated the 
“wholesale harassment” of Black Americans by the police force.51 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD 
A. The Creation of the Reasonable Suspicion Standard and the 
Significance of Race 
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be secure in 
their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by 
government officials.52  The Fourth Amendment also provides that a search is 
unreasonable if not supported by probable cause.53  Prior to 1968, to justify a 
stop and frisk, a police officer’s belief that criminal behavior was afoot had to 
rise to the level of probable cause as stated in the Fourth Amendment.54  In 
1968, the Terry decision immensely lowered that standard.55  In Terry, the 
 
 48. See Hassett-Walker, supra note 34. 
 49. See Civil Rights Movement, HIST. (Oct. 27, 2009), https://www.history.com/ 
topics/black-history/civil-rights-movement; see also infra Part III. 
 50. See infra Part III. 
 51. See Devon W. Carbado, From Stop and Frisk to Shoot and Kill: Terry v. Ohio’s Pathway to 
Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1508, 1537 (2017) [hereinafter Carbado, From Stop and Frisk]; 
see also infra Parts III, IV. 
 52. U.S. Const. amend. IV. (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no [w]arrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by [o]ath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Mia Carpiniello, Striking a Sincere Balance: A Reasonable Black Person Standard for 
“Location Plus Evasion” Terry Stops, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 355, 356 (2001). 
 55. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968); Carpiniello, supra note 54, at 356. 
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Supreme Court held that if a police officer sees something suspicious that does 
not quite rise to the level of probable cause, an officer may temporarily detain 
a “suspect” for further investigation if what the officer sees establishes 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.56  Additionally, if that 
police officer has reason to believe that the “suspect” is armed and dangerous, 
the officer is permitted by law to conduct a limited search for weapons for the 
purpose of ensuring his or her own safety.57 
The Supreme Court created reasonable suspicion as an intermediate 
standard, less demanding than probable cause, to justify police seizures that 
amount to less than full-blown arrests.58  The Court constructed this 
intermediate standard for several reasons.59  First, the Court realized that many 
pre-arrest level encounters between citizens and police officers were 
unregulated by rules and standards and, accordingly, could not be reviewed.60  
Second, the Court found that the government’s significant interest in crime 
prevention and detection would be furthered if it allowed investigatory stops 
and frisks.61  Third, the Court found that the importance of maintaining officer 
safety outweighed the significantly intrusive nature of frisks.62  Although 
reasonable suspicion is a court-constructed intermediate level of suspicion, 
the investigatory stops and frisks that it authorizes are still governed by the 
mandate of the Fourth Amendment because they are not voluntary 
encounters.63  Unfortunately, reasonable suspicion has since been construed 
to give law enforcement officers extreme discretion, and as a consequence has 
caused an unjustifiably disproportionate impact on racial minorities and the 
 
 56. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.  The officer may briefly stop the “suspect” in order to either confirm 
or dispel the suspicion.  See id. at 28.  The officer’s reasonable suspicion must be supported by specific 
and articulable facts and a rational inference based on those facts.  Id. at 21.  “Reasonable suspicion is 
evaluated in light of the totality of circumstances and from the perspective of a reasonable person in 
the police officer’s situation.”  Carpiniello, supra note 54, at 356 (emphasis added). 
 57. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (“[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable 
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is 
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest 
the individual for a crime.”). 
 58. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 10–11; Carbado, From Stop and Frisk, supra note 51, at 1521. 
 59. See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 17 (noting that not creating this level of suspicion would “isolate from 
constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of the contact between the policeman and the citizen”). 
 61. See id. at 22–23. 
 62. See id. at 25–27. 
 63. See id. at 11. 
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poor.64 
Often de-emphasized is “the broader racial backdrop” during the 
litigation of the Terry case—decided in 1968—that helped shape the 
development of the doctrine.65  Throughout the 1960s “a number of ‘race-
riots’ had occurred in American inner cities—including in Philadelphia, 
Harlem, Watts, Cleveland, Omaha, Chicago, Detroit, Baltimore, and 
Washington, D.C. among other places.”66  There were many factors 
contributing to “the tense relationship between the police and [Black] 
Americans, including the rampant utilization of stops and frisks, [which] 
played a causal role in every riot.”67  Other factors included: the Black Panther 
Party emerged and were policing the police;68 Bloody Sunday (a march from 
Selma to Montgomery) was fresh in the public’s mind;69 Richard Nixon’s 
 
 64. See infra Part IV. 
 65. See Carbado, From Stop and Frisk, supra note 51, at 1528. 
 66. See Carbado, From Stop and Frisk, supra note 51, at 1516. 
 67. See Carbado, From Stop and Frisk, supra note 51, at 1516.  Almost every instance was 
precipitated by a police incident, often the killing or beating of a Black American.  Elizabeth Fiedler, 
Remembering the 1964 Riots in North Philadelphia, WHYY (Aug. 25, 2014), 
https://whyy.org/articles/remembering-the-1964-riots-in-north-philadelphia-photos/; Harlem race 
riot of 1964, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Harlem-race-riot-of-1964 (last 
updated July 11, 2020); Jill A. Edy, Watts Riots of 1965, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/event/Watts-Riots-of-1965 (last updated Aug. 4, 2020); Photos: March 
1968 Omaha Race Riot, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Mar. 4, 2018), https://www.omaha.com/photos-
march-omaha-race-riot/collection_53e3cdb2-c5a8-5a6c-9755-dce062108dad.html; David Taylor & 
Sam Morris, The Whole World is Watching: How the 1968 Chicago ‘Police Riot’ Shocked America 
and Divided the Nation, GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ng-interactive/2018/ 
aug/19/the-whole-world-is-watching-chicago-police-riot-vietnam-war-regan (last visited Aug. 28, 
2020); Traqina Quarks Emeka, Detroit Riot of 1967, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica. 
com/event/Detroit-Riot-of-1967 (last updated July 16, 2020). 
 68. Garrett Albert Duncan, Black Panther Party, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica. 
com/topic/Black-Panther-Party (last visited Aug. 28, 2020).  The Black Panther Party was founded in 
Oakland, California in 1966, for the original purpose of patrolling Black American neighborhoods “to 
protect residents from acts of police brutality.”  Id. 
 69. Christopher Klein, How Selma’s ‘Bloody Sunday’ Became a Turning Point in the Civil Rights 
Movement, HIST. (Mar. 6, 2015), https://www.history.com/news/selmas-bloody-sunday-50-years-ago.  
“On ‘Bloody Sunday,’ March 7, 1965, some 600 civil rights marchers headed east out of Selma” while 
peacefully demonstrating for voting rights.  Alabama: The Selma-to-Montgomery March, NAT’L PARK 
SERV., https://www.nps.gov/places/alabama-the-selmatomontgomery-march.htm (last updated Apr. 
23, 2020).  State and local police officers attacked the demonstrators with billy clubs and tear gas.  Id.  
“The most shocking moment in the Selma campaign was a television phenomenon: news coverage of 
the beating and gassing of hundreds of peaceful marchers on the Edmund Pettus Bridge who’d planned 
a defiant walk to the Alabama state capitol in protest of the disenfranchisement of [B]lack voters.”  
#Selma50: What the Media and Hollywood Got Wrong About ‘Bloody Sunday,’ NBC NEWS (Mar. 8, 
2015, 3:23 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/media-studies-selma-n319436. 
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1968 campaign for President was premised on an appeal to White Americans 
about the criminality of Black people;70 and President John F. Kennedy, 
Malcolm X, Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., and Senator Robert Kennedy 
had all been assassinated.71 
Race relations and racial profiling by the police force was so pivotal in 
the country at the time Terry was decided that the Court expressly addressed 
the issue in the majority opinion.72  In acknowledging the aggressive 
utilization of stop-and-frisks in Black communities, Chief Justice Warren 
wrote: “The wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police 
community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently 
complain, will not be stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from any 
 
 70. See ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 44.  Political strategists have “admitted that appealing to 
racial fears and antagonisms was central to th[e] [Southern] strategy” i.e., using law and order rhetoric 
to create a new majority among working class [W]hites based on appealing to racial fears.  Id. at 43–
44.  “H.R. Haldeman, one of Nixon’s key advisers, recalls that Nixon himself deliberately pursued a 
Southern Racial Strategy: ‘[President Nixon] emphasized that you have to face the fact that the whole 
problem is really the [B]lacks.  The key is to devise a system that recognizes this while not appearing 
to.’”  Id.  Special counsel to President Nixon, John Ehrlichman, explained that the Nixon 
administration’s campaign strategy of 1968 was “We’ll go after the racists.”  Id.  He believed that the 
“subliminal appeal to the anti-[B]lack voter was always present in Nixon’s statements and speeches.”  
Id.  This is particularly important because politics and political polarization often affects the Supreme 
Court.  See, e.g., Trevor Burrus, How Political Polarization Affects the Supreme Court, CATO INST. 
(July 30, 2018), https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/how-political-polarization-affects-
supreme-court. 
 71. See Carbado, From Stop and Frisk, supra note 51, at 1529 n.81.  John F. Kennedy was 
assassinated on November 22, 1963, just past his first thousand days in office.  John F. Kennedy, 
WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/john-f-kennedy/ (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2020).  President Kennedy “took vigorous actions in the cause of equal rights,” calling 
for Congress to pass new civil rights legislation.  Id.  Malcolm X was assassinated on February 21, 
1965; his ideas and speeches contributed to the development of Black nationalist ideology and the 
Black Power movement.  Lawrence A. Mamiya, Malcolm X, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Malcolm-X (last visited Aug. 29, 2020).  Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. was assassinated on April 4, 1968 while standing on the balcony of his motel room in 
Memphis, Tennessee.  About Dr. King, KING CTR., https://thekingcenter.org/about-dr-king/ (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2020); Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. is assassinated, HIST., https://www.history.com/ 
this-day-in-history/dr-king-is-assassinated (last visited Aug. 29, 2020).  Senator Robert Kennedy was 
assassinated on June 5, 1968 “shortly after delivering a speech to celebrate his win in the California 
primary.”  Robert Kennedy, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/1960s/robert-f-kennedy (last 
updated Aug. 28, 2018).  Robert Kennedy fought against organized crime, worked for civil rights for 
Black Americans, advocated for the poor and racial minorities, and opposed escalation of the Vietnam 
War.  Id. 
 72. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14–15, 14 n.11. 
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criminal trial.”73  With social upheaval happening across the country, and the 
prominence of race relations in the litigation itself, “Chief Justice Warren 
presumably knew that he had to say something about race.”74  Nevertheless, 
because the Warren Court framed the issue in Terry as being about 
suppression of evidence rather than police racial harassment, “the majority 
created the reasonable suspicion standard that allowed subjective assessments 
of suspects’ behavior to substitute for the more demanding standard of 
probable cause.”75 
Presumably anticipating doctrinal shifts over time, the Terry Court 
declined to articulate clear standards for what behavior constituted reasonable 
suspicion.76  However, in doing so, the Court deferred to the “professional 
experience” and judgment of the same officers it had just acknowledged were 
oftentimes misusing their authority,77 which in turn perpetuated and legalized 
 
 73. Id. at 14–15 (footnote omitted).  The racial backdrops of this litigation primed Chief Justice 
Warren to take up the question of race.  Carbado, From Stop and Frisk, supra note 51, at 1528.  There 
was an emerging political debate about the Supreme Court’s civil rights jurisprudence, specifically 
concerning whether the Warren Court had gone too far too soon with respect to civil rights—
particularly issues of criminal justice.  See Carbado, From Stop and Frisk, supra note 51, at 1529.  
Earl C. Dudley, clerk to Chief Justice Warren at the time of the decision, noted that underlying the 
decision was the political tension and escalating violence that was occurring at the time of the decision 
in 1967.  See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, the Warren Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A Law 
Clerk’s Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 891, 892 (1998).  For example, “[o]nly two months before 
Terry was handed down, there was a major outbreak of rioting in many cities, including Washington, 
D.C., in the wake of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.”  Id. 
 74. See Carbado, From Stop and Frisk, supra note 51, at 1530. 
 75. See Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 56 (2016); see also Terry, 
392 U.S. at 30 (“[T]he revolver seized from Terry was properly admitted in evidence against him.”).  
Justice Douglas dissented in Terry, arguing that police should not be free to conduct warrantless 
searches whenever they suspect someone to be a criminal because not requiring the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement risked opening the door to the same abuses that gave rise to the 
American Revolution.  Id. at 38–39 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 76. See Carbado, From Stop and Frisk, supra note 51, at 1533–34. 
 77. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 n.11.  A cited report from the President’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice found that “in many communities, field interrogations are 
a major source of friction between the police and minority groups.”  Id.  The report stated that “misuse 
of field interrogations increases as more police departments adopt ‘aggressive patrol’ in which officers 
are encouraged routinely to stop and question persons on the street who are unknown to them, who 
are suspicious, or whose purpose for being abroad is not readily evident.”  PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON 
LAW ENF’T AND ADMIN. OF JUST., TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 184 (1967), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/147374NCJRS.pdf.  The Court recognized, and even 
cited, that stop and frisks of youths or minority group members is oftentimes “motivated by the 
officers’ perceived need to maintain the power image of the beat officer, an aim sometimes 
accomplished by humiliating anyone who attempts to undermine police control of the streets.”  Terry, 
392 U.S. at 14 n.11. 
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that very misuse.78  Since the Terry decision, stops, interrogations, and 
searches of ordinary people conducting everyday activities such as walking 
home, driving, or riding the bus or train “have become commonplace—at least 
for people of color,”79 resulting from the Court’s lack of clarity as to what 
behaviors amount to reasonable suspicion.80 
B. Modern Application of the Reasonable Suspicion Standard 
Recognizing the lower courts’ inability to determine uniform 
“reasonableness” by the year 2000,81 the Court provided more guidance as to 
assessing the reasonableness of an officer’s suspicion.82  In Illinois v. 
Wardlow—a 5–4 decision—the Court closely considered flight as a factor and 
held that location, specifically a high crime neighborhood, plus evasion 
constitutes the requisite reasonable suspicion for justifying an investigatory 
stop-and-frisk.83  In that case, Wardlow—a Black American man—fled at the 
sight of police vehicles “patrolling an area [in Chicago] known for heavy 
narcotics trafficking.”84  The Court emphasized that while ignoring the police 
is indicative of nothing, “nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in 
determining reasonable suspicion.”85  The Court reasoned that nervous or 
evasive behavior “is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is 
 
 78. See id.; infra Part IV. 
 79. See ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 63–64; infra Part IV. 
 80. See infra Part IV. 
 81. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 n.1 (2000). 
 82. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 119–20.  Reasonable suspicion is typically generated by a collection 
of articulable facts available to the officers in each case.  Id. at 119–20. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 121. 
 85. Id. at 124–25.  The Court then cited three cases to support this contention.  Id. at 124.  In United 
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, border patrol officers stopped the defendant’s car because of the occupants’ 
apparent Mexican descent.  422 U.S. 873, 875 (1975).  The Court condemned the officers’ behavior, 
stating that while “[t]he driver’s behavior may be relevant, as erratic driving or obvious attempts to 
evade officers can support a reasonable suspicion,” suspicion solely based on the race of a defendant 
is unreasonable.  Id. at 885–86.  In Florida v. Rodriguez,  officers observed a defendant’s unusual 
behavior once they were sighted.  469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (per curiam).  The Court ruled that the 
“[r]espondent’s strange movements in his attempt to evade the officers aroused further justifiable 
suspicion.”  Id.  In United States v. Sokolow, Drug Enforcement Administration agents began 
investigating the defendant after learning that he had paid cash for his $2,100 airline ticket to spend a 
short time in Miami.  490 U.S. 1, 4 (1989).  The Court observed “that the suspect took an evasive or 
erratic path through [the] airport” which met “the test for showing ‘ongoing criminal activity.’”  Id. at 
8. 
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certainly suggestive of such.”86  Additionally, the Court ruled that the 
occurrence of the stop in a “high crime area” is also a factor suggestive of 
wrongdoing.87 
In Justice Stevens’ dissent, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer, Justice Stevens emphasized the importance of “looking to the totality 
of the circumstances—the whole picture.”88  Accordingly, many factors are 
necessarily relevant to this totality of the circumstances analysis, including: 
“the time of day, the number of people in the area, the character of the 
neighborhood, whether the officer was in uniform, the way the runner was 
dressed, the direction and speed of the flight, and whether the person’s 
behavior was otherwise unusual.”89  In Wardlow, the Court differentiated 
unprovoked flight from the right to go about one’s business, and held that 
“[h]eadlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion” 
indicative of wrongdoing.90  Notably, race and ethnicity are not taken into 
account under the Court’s analysis.91  Instead, the Court reiterates its 
 
 86. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. 
 87. Id.  This has “resulted in stops and frisks of residents of inner cities—primarily poor persons, 
[Black] Americans, and Hispanic Americans—far out of proportion to their numbers, and often 
without justification.”  David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor 
Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 677 (1994). 
 88. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126–27.  The dissent reminds the Court that “‘the relevant inquiry’ 
concerning the inferences and conclusions a court draws ‘is not whether particular conduct is 
“innocent” or “guilty,” but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal 
acts.’”  Id. at 128 (quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10). 
 89. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 129–30. 
In determining whether there is reasonable suspicion for a stop, the police may consider 
the time and location of the purported offense as well as information about the suspect’s 
behavior, including flight, which may convey a consciousness of guilt, or furtive gestures, 
which may suggest the suspect has something to hide. 
Kristin Henning, Boys to Men: The Role of Policing in the Socialization of Black Boys, in POLICING 
THE BLACK MAN 57, 85 (Angela J. Davis ed., Vintage Books 2018). 
 90. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124–25. 
 91. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119.  Justice Stevens’ dissent reminds the Court that in creating the 
flight factor, the preceding courts were valuing the archaic idea that “[t]he wicked flee when no man 
pursueth: but the righteous are as bold as a lion.”  Id. at 129 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (quoting Proverbs 28:1).  Justice Stevens rejected reliance on this proverb because 
its “‘ivory-towered analysis of the real world’ fails to account for the experiences of many citizens of 
this country, particularly those who are minorities.”  Id.  It is a proverb that “fails to capture the total 
reality of our world,” which in turn, fails to capture the totality of the circumstances.  Id.; see also 
Hickory v. United States, 160 U.S. 408, 420 (1896) stating: 
Our ancestors, observing that guilty persons usually fled from justice, adopted the hasty 
conclusion that it was only the guilty who did so, . . . so that under the old law a man who 
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commitment to the  race-neutral standard for reasonable suspicion to justify a 
police stop.92  In effect, this standard has subjected Black Americans “to a 
disproportionate number of stops” because, while purporting to be race-
neutral, the standard has turned a blind eye to the unique relationship between 
Black Americans and the police force.93 
In 2019, in United States v. Brown, the Ninth Circuit found that “officers 
lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot 
before stopping Brown.”94  Brown, a Black man who matched a description 
from an unreliable tip, ran away from a patrol car that had been silently 
following him before flashing its lights.95  Specifically, after receiving “an 
anonymous tip that a Black man was carrying a gun,” police officers began to 
tail Brown “for several blocks before turning on [the vehicle] patrol lights.”96  
After “[s]eeing the lights and patrol car coming from behind him, Brown 
ran.”97  The officers “pursued Brown for one block before stopping him and 
ordering him to the ground at gunpoint,” placing him in handcuffs, and 
searching him.98  They found a firearm, “drugs, cash, and other items.”99 
The Ninth Circuit held that “[i]n evaluating flight as a basis for reasonable 
suspicion, we cannot totally discount the issue of race.”100  In analyzing 
Brown’s flight as a factor, the court was especially “hesitant to allow flight to 
carry the day in authorizing the stop,” especially “[g]iven [that] racial 
 
fled to avoid being tried for felony forfeited all his goods, even though he were 
acquitted. . . .  “In modern times more correct views have prevailed, and the evasion of or 
flight from justice seems now nearly reduced to its true place in the administration of the 
criminal law, namely, that of a circumstance[—]a fact which it is always of importance to 
take into consideration, and combined with others may afford strong evidence of guilt, but 
which, like any other piece of presumptive evidence, it is equally absurd and dangerous to 
invest with infallibility.” 
Id. 
 92. See Carpiniello, supra note 54, at 355–57. 
 93. See Carpiniello, supra note 54, at 355; infra Part IV. 
 94. See United States v. Brown, 925 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 95. Id. at 1151–52. 
 96. Id. at 1152. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1152–53. 
 99. Id. at 1153. 
 100. Id. at 1156.  The court cited to its past decision in Washington v. Lambert, which “addressed 
at length ‘the burden of aggressive and intrusive police action [that] falls disproportionately on 
African-American, and sometimes Latino, males’ and observed that ‘as a practical matter neither 
society nor our enforcement of the laws is yet color-blind.”  See id.; Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 
1181, 1187–88 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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dynamics in our society—along with a simple desire not to interact with 
police—offer an ‘innocent’ explanation of flight.”101  Furthermore, the Court 
noted “that uneven policing may reasonably affect [even innocent 
individuals’] reactions to law enforcement”: 
[C]overage of racial disparities in policing has increased, amplifying 
awareness of these issues.  This uptick in reporting is partly 
attributable to the availability of information and data on police 
practices.  Although such data cannot replace the “commonsense 
judgments and inferences about human behavior” underlying the 
reasonable suspicion analysis, it can inform the inferences to be 
drawn from an individual who decides to step away, run, or flee 
from police without a clear reason to do otherwise.102 
Therefore, under Brown, the Ninth Circuit mandated that race must be 
considered—and not discounted—as a factor in a totality of the circumstances 
analysis of reasonable suspicion involving flight (namely, nervous or evasive 
behavior).103  Echoing Justice Stevens’ dissent in Wardlow, the court 
“recognized that flight can be a problematic factor in the reasonable suspicion 
analysis”104 because many citizens—particularly in the Black American 
community—believe that it is essential to avoid interacting with the police 
force for their own health and safety.105  The court recognized that this belief 
results from racial disparities in policing throughout history and the unveiling 
and amplification of those disparities through the use of oral traditions, 
research, and pervasive multimedia coverage and exposure, which have only 
increased as technology advances.106 
  
 
 101. Brown, 925 F.3d at 1157. 
 102. Id. at 1156 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126–40 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); Brown, 925 F.3d at 1156; see also Carpiniello, supra note 54, at 359–63 (analyzing 
the variety of legitimate and non-criminal reasons why a Black American would flee from the police 
including: violence avoidance, bystander violence, and skepticism toward police due to a lack of 
confidence in police officers as unbiased law enforcers); infra Section IV.A. 
 106. See infra Section IV.A. 
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IV. THE COURT’S “RACE-NEUTRAL” APPROACH TO REASONABLE 
SUSPICION AND ITS IMPACT ON BLACK AMERICANS 
The Supreme Court is convinced that applying color-blind standards is a 
“moral requirement of society, particularly in the field of criminal law.”107  In 
the Wardlow case, the Court essentially held that “[r]ace-specific reasons for 
flight are irrelevant [in determining] reasonable suspicion.”108  Although the 
Supreme Court purportedly uses a color-blind approach when evaluating 
reasonable suspicion, race nonetheless “influences the Court’s determination 
of reasonable suspicion as much as it does a suspect’s decision to flee and an 
officer’s decision to stop the suspect.”109 
In the seminal case, Terry—and many cases to follow—the Court 
recognized the direct correlation between race and the criminal justice system 
and acknowledged the racial disparities that exist in policing.110  The Court 
also acknowledged and analyzed the quality and nature of police intrusion on 
an individual’s rights while being subjected to a police frisk for weapons,111 
and admitted that a “limited search of the outer clothing for weapons 
constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, 
and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating 
experience.”112  The Court continued, “[t]he protective search for weapons . . . 
constitutes a brief, though far from inconsiderable, intrusion upon the sanctity 
of the person.”113  In those terms, because Black Americans have always been 
significantly more likely to be subjected to stop-and-frisks, this racial 
disparity throughout the history of policing has intruded upon the “cherished 
personal security” and the sanctity of Black Americans.114 
 
 107. See Carpiniello, supra note 54, at 368. 
 108. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125–26; Carpiniello, supra note 54, at 369. 
 109. See Carpiniello, supra note 54, at 368. 
 110. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1968). 
 111. Id. at 24–25. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 26. 
 114. Id. at 125; see supra Part II; infra Part VI; see, e.g., Darwin BondGraham, Black People in 
California Are Stopped Far More Often by Police, Major Study Proves, GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jan/02/california-police-black-stops-force; Henry K. 
Lee, Study Indicates Racial Profiling by Oakland Cops/ACLU Releases New Report, SFGATE (May 
12, 2001), https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Study-indicates-racial-profiling-by-Oakland-cops-
2921498.php; infra note 155 and accompanying text.  The NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund 
filed an amicus brief when Terry reached the Supreme Court “in which they argued against lowering 
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Police intrusion upon the sanctity of Black Americans, along with the 
increase in the reporting of these instances, has organically and unsurprisingly 
created a culture of fear, skepticism, and resentment towards the police force, 
resulting in the spawn of survival mechanisms including police avoidance.115  
Many Black Americans do not feel safe in the presence of police officers, and 
the amplification of police practices—particularly negative practices—and 
violence displayed on multimedia platforms perpetuates that culture of fear, 
skepticism, and resentment, causing individuals to react in nervous or evasive 
ways before or during an interaction.116  This nervous or evasive behavior, 
analyzed in Wardlow, might not seem reasonable to individuals living outside 
of the Black experience, but to individuals living within it, it is reasonable, 
practical, and sometimes advisable.117  As a means of self-preservation, which 
is regarded as a basic instinct in human beings,118 Black Americans often 
avoid the police to avoid police misconduct—which is more likely to affect 
Black Americans—and bystander violence.119 
By using a race-neutral reasonableness standard in assessing whether a 
police officer has the justifiable reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk a 
citizen, the courts undermine the significance of race and the profoundly 
different experience/relationship that Black Americans have had with the 
 
the probable cause standard to one subject to less scrutiny.  The brief purposed to represent the 
‘everyman,’ or the numerous innocent people who had already been subjected to the indignity of a 
stop and frisk.”  Thomas Stack, Racial Biases within Stop and Frisk: The Product of Inherently Flawed 
Judicial Precedent, 4 RAMAPO J. OF L. & SOC’Y 3, 13 (2018), https://www.ramapo.edu/law-
journal/files/2018/09/Stack-FINAL-1.pdf (citation omitted).  Moreover, the NAACP contended that 
Black Americans were subject to stop and frisk at a disproportionate rate largely due to the racial bias 
that is prevalent in the police force.  Id. 
 115. See United States v. Brown, 925 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Among some citizens, 
particularly minorities and those residing in high crime areas, there is also the possibility that the 
fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification, believes that contact with the 
police can itself be dangerous, apart from any criminal activity associated with the officer’s sudden 
presence.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 132 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part))).  This culture of fear, skepticism, and resentment stems partly from the 
“annoying,” “frightening,” and “humiliating” experience of being stopped and frisked at 
disproportionate rates since the inception of the stop and frisk.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 125; see supra note 
114 and accompanying text. 
 116. See infra Section IV.A. 
 117. See infra Section IV.A. 
 118. Self-Preservation Instinct, AM. PSYCHOLOGY ASS’N DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY, 
https://dictionary.apa.org/self-preservation-instinct (last visited Aug. 29, 2020). 
 119. See infra Part IV; Carpiniello, supra note 54, at 358–60. 
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police force since its inception.120  Evading police officers is not always a 
decision; many times it is a reaction related to the sociological experience of 
the Black American community as a means of survival.121  It can also be an 
educated decision from an innocent person who knows and understands the 
history of the police force and underlying biases within society, including 
municipal police departments.122  Racial disparities in policing, as well as 
videos circulated through multimedia, induce Black Americans to “anticipate 
biased treatment and therefore exhibit resistant behavior, such as flight.  When 
police react to flight with harsh treatment, they reinforce existing perceptions 
of racial bias.”123 
A. Racial Disparities in Policing and Their Psychological Effects on Black 
Americans 
Today, significant racial disparities remain in the United States criminal 
justice system, stemming in part from the disparities in policing.124  “In 2016, 
[B]lack Americans comprised 27% of all individuals arrested in the United 
States—double their share of the total population.”125  Black youth made up 
35% of juveniles arrested that year, despite accounting for 15% of all U.S. 
children.126  While many attempt to link this crime rate to race and the function 
 
 120. See Carpiniello, supra note 54, at 358 (“[T]he current reasonable police officer standard for 
Terry stops fails to recognize the unique Black perspective on police encounters.  As such, it 
perpetuates racial discrimination by re-enforcing existing racial hierarchies while maintaining a façade 
of race-neutrality.”). 
 121. See infra Part IV.A. 
 122. See Carpiniello, supra note 54, at 360 (“Black men perceive the police as a controlling force 
that functions only to enforce the social, economic, and political interests of Whites rather than as their 
protectors.”); see also infra Part IV.A. 
 123. Carpiniello, supra note 54, at 362. 
 124. See Harris, supra note 87, at 680 (“[Black] Americans are vastly overrepresented in prisons 
and jails relative to their numbers in the general population.”).  In 2014, Black Americans constituted 
34% of the total correctional population in America—2.3 million out of 6.8 million.  Criminal Justice 
Fact Sheet, NAACP, https://www.naacp.org/criminal-justice-fact-sheet/ (last visited March 20, 2020).  
Moreover, Black Americans “are incarcerated at more than 5 times the rate of” White Americans.  Id.  
Additionally, Black American children represent “32% of children who are arrested, 42% of children 
who are detained, and 52% of children whose cases are judicially waived to criminal court.”  Id.  “As 
of 2001, one of every three black boys born in that year could expect to go to prison in his lifetime.”  
Report to the United Nations on Racial Disparities in the U.S. Criminal Justice System, THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT (April 19, 2018), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-
on-racial-disparities/. 
 125. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 124. 
 126. Id. 
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of concentrated urban poverty—which is more common among Black 
Americans than any other racial group— “[W]hite Americans overestimate 
the proportion of crime committed by [Black Americans, and] overlook the 
fact that communities of color are disproportionately victims of crime, and 
discount the prevalence of bias in the criminal justice system,” including in 
police practices.127  The reality is that “[m]ore [Black] American adults are 
under correctional control today—in prison or jail, on probation or parole—
than were enslaved in 1850, a decade before the Civil War began.”128  Both 
the War on Drugs and “Stop, Question, and Frisk” policing policies have 
created a higher level of police contact with Black Americans, which 
consequently has led to higher levels of police contact with innocent people 
and corresponding higher levels of arrests for drug crimes.129 
 
 127. Id.  Once pulled over, [B]lack drivers are “three times [more] likely [than] [W]hites to be 
searched” and “twice as likely as [W]hites to be arrested.”  Id.  “These patterns hold even though 
police officers generally have a lower ‘contraband hit rate’ when they search [B]lack versus [W]hite 
drivers.”  Id. 
 128. See ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 180. 
 129. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 124; ALEXANDER, supra note 30, at 62–63.  For 
instance, “[M]ore than one in four people arrested for drug violations in 2015 was [B]lack [despite the 
fact that] drug use rates do not differ substantially by race and ethnicity and drug users generally 
purchase drugs from people of the same race or ethnicity.”  THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 
124.  According to Judge Shira A. Scheindlin, in 2013, New York’s highest officials had “turned a 
blind eye to the evidence that officers are conducting stops in a racially discriminatory manner,” which 
led Judge Scheindlin to declare the city’s stop-and-frisk tactic unconstitutional as it was “broadly 
target[ing] male residents of neighborhoods populated by low-income people of color.”  Id.  The New 
York Civil Liberties Union analyzed the New York Police Department’s stop and frisk data and found 
that 41.6% of all stops were of “[B]lack and Latino males between the ages of 14 and 24,” while they 
only made up 4.7% of the population in New York.  New NYCLU Report Finds NYPD Stop-And-Frisk 
Practices Ineffective, Reveals Depth of Racial Disparities, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION  
(May 9, 2012), https://www.nyclu.org/en/press-releases/new-nyclu-report-finds-nypd-stop-and-frisk-
practices-ineffective-reveals-depth-racial.  No crime had been committed in 90 percent of those stops 
and “[t]he number of stops of young [B]lack men exceeded the entire city' population of young [B]lack 
men” by 9,720.  Id.  In Los Angeles, between 2003 and 2004 (the most recent results provided by the 
LAPD), “[Black] Americans were stopped by police at a rate of 4,500 stops per 10,000, as compared 
to only 1,750 per 10,000 non-minority residents. . . .  Once stopped, [Black] Americans were 127% 
more likely to be frisked than were stopped [W]hites.”  Thomas Stack, Racial Biases within Stop and 
Frisk: The Product of Inherently Flawed Judicial Precedent, RAMAPO J. OF L. & SOC’Y 3, 21–22 
(Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.ramapo.edu/law-journal/files/2018/09/Stack-FINAL-1.pdf. 
This evidence suggests that [B]lack Americans are stopped and frisked based on a lower 
threshold of evidence than [W]hite Americans.  [Black] Americans are significantly more 
likely to be subjected to a frisk once stopped; a factor which cannot be ameliorated by 
racially neutral justifications such as a higher yield rate.  Such factors have led [scholars] 
to conclude that [Black] Americans are “over-stopped, over-frisked, and over-arrested,” 
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Today, Black Americans are killed by the police at a disproportionately 
high rate, which, thanks to cell phone videos, social network postings, online 
petitions and articles, and the twenty-four hour news cycle, is being exposed 
worldwide as a major social problem in the United States.130  Prior to 2017, 
there was no effort to keep official statistics about these incidents.131  It was 
not until the Department of Justice, in response to criticism, “introduced a 
pilot program designed to gather national data on use of force by police” that 
such tracking began.132  National newspapers such as The Guardian and The 
Washington Post now have websites counting the number of people killed by 
law enforcement officers.133  In 2016 alone, 962 people were killed by police 
in the United States; of that number, 223 (twenty-three percent) were Black 
men, despite making up approximately six percent of the national 
population.134 
Furthermore, Black Americans—men in particular—are twenty-one 
times more likely to be killed by police officers than White men are.135  From 
2010 to 2012, the 1,217 deadly police shootings “show that [B]lacks, age 15 
to 19, were killed at a rate of 31.17 per million, while just 1.47 per million 
[W]hite males in that age range died at the hands of  police.”136  These 
disparities are not only present in policing, but they are also very present in 
the system the police officers enforce.137  This system includes: pretrial, 
 
due to their race. 
Id. at 22.  Similar empirical studies were done in major cities all over the United States including 
Philadelphia, Chicago, and New York City.  See id. at 22–27.  These studies were all done in more 
recent years and all yielded similar results.  Id. 
 130. See infra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 131. Katheryn Russell-Brown, Making Implicit Bias Explicit, in POLICING THE BLACK MAN 135, 
136 (Angela J. Davis ed., Vintage Books 2018). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Jessie D. McKinnon & Claudette E. Bennett, We the People: Blacks in the United States, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 2005), https://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/censr-25.pdf; see also Fatal 
Force, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/police-
shootings-2016/. 
 134.  See id.; Jesse. D. McKinnon & Claudette E. Bennett, We The People: Blacks in the United 
States, CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS, 1 (August 2005), https://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2005pubs/censr-25.pdf; see also Fatal Force, WASH. POST, supra note 133. 
 135. Ryan Gabrielson, Eric Sagara, & Ryann Grochowski Jones, Deadly Force, in Black and White, 
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/deadly-force-in-black-and-white. 
 136. Id.; see WASH. POST, supra note 133 (reporting that eighteen unarmed Black men were shot 
and killed by the police in the U.S. in 2016). 
 137. See infra note 138. 
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sentencing, parole, and post-prison/collateral consequences.138  There are 
stark racial disparities that exist at every step of the criminal process from 
arrest through the sentencing process.139  Witnessing, hearing, and seeing 
these statistics and practices replayed—whether it be in person or through 
stories and media accounts—is known to have traumatic psychological effects 
on the community enduring these systemic hardships.140 
1. Transgenerational Effects 
There has been a great deal of emerging research exploring “how 
historical and cultural traumas affect survivors’ children for generations.”141  
These transgenerational effects extend far beyond just psychological; they are 
also “familial, social, cultural, neurobiological, and possibly even genetic.”142  
Specifically, “while direct studies on intergenerational effects may be sparse, 
it’s not difficult to spot such impacts in current generations of [Black] 
Americans.”143  One of the most prevalent examples evidencing the existence 
of transgenerational trauma within the Black American community is the 
dread that Black American parents face when talking to their sons about 
potential police encounters.144  Because Black Americans are more likely to 
have family members with personal experiences of being verbally or 
physically abused by the police and are more likely to have such experiences 
themselves, “it is no surprise that [B]lack families have been proactive in 
transmitting norms on dealing with law enforcement.”145  These lessons 
 
 138. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 124.  “[Black] Americans were incarcerated in 
local jails at a rate 3.5 times that of non-Hispanic [W]hites in 2016.”  Id.  Nationally, the imprisonment 
rate for Black Americans adults is 5.9 times the rate of white adults and is at far higher rates in some 
states.  Id.  “Nearly half (48%) of the 206,000 people serving life and ‘virtual life’ prison sentences 
are [Black] Americans.”  Id.  As revealed by The New York Times, “comparable in-prison conduct—
a major determinant of parole decisions—may result in divergent prison disciplinary records for 
[Black Americans] versus [W]hites.”  Id.  “In 2010, 8% of all adults in the United States had a felony 
conviction on their record[; however,] [a]mong [B]lack American men, the rate was one in three 
(33%).”  Id. 
 139. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 124. 
 140. See infra Parts IV.A.1, IV.A.2. 
 141. Tori DeAngelis, The Legacy of Trauma, 50 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N No. 2 (Feb. 2019), 
https://www.apa.org/monitor/2019/02/legacy-trauma. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. (“It’s traumatizing for parents and it’s traumatizing for kids.”). 
 145. See Henning, supra note 89, at 64. 
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typically resemble the following: 
And you know now, if you did not before, that the police departments 
of your country have been endowed with the authority to destroy 
your body.  It does not matter if the destruction is the result of an 
unfortunate overreaction.  It does not matter if it originates in a 
misunderstanding.  It does not matter if the destruction springs from 
a foolish policy.146 
This trauma is deemed by Dr. Alfiee Breland-Noble, director of the 
African American Knowledge Optimized for Mindfully Healthy Adolescents 
Project (AAKOMA) at Georgetown University to be a “‘shared stress’—the 
feeling that you have to manage everything within your own community 
because you don’t know what you’ll encounter in society at large.”147 
According to Dr. Noble, “[t]here is a sense among [Black] Americans and 
other marginalized people that our stressors are unique to us and not 
necessarily shared by people outside our groups. . . . So, we share stories of 
our lived experiences that help set the stage for how our loved ones encounter 
the world.”148  These shared stories and experiences often “lead to general 
distrust of others outside the group[, especially] those from historically 
oppressive groups” such as the police force.149  The combination of 
historically oppressive treatment of Black Americans by the police force in 
the United States, the distrust and skepticism of the police force by Black 
Americans,150 and the uptick in reporting of racial disparities in policing—
including viral videos of police using excessive force—has a significant 
impact on the behaviors of Black Americans when interacting with police 
 
 146. Ta-Nehisi Coates, Letter to My Son: Excerpts from Between the World and Me, THE ATLANTIC 
(July 4, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/tanehisi-coates-between-the-
world-and-me/397619/.  Other instructions include: “always keep your hands where they can see 
them”; “avoid sudden movements”; “behave in a courteous and respectful manner toward officers”; 
and “[d]on’t do nothing, don’t say nothing smart.”  Henning, supra note 89, at 64. 
 147. See DeAngelis, supra note 141. 
 148. Id.  The Black American community shares this wisdom to younger generations as a means of 
passing down survival tactics for moving through a society  which has marginalized them—often 
brutally—in hopes that the younger generation will find a way to survive it (i.e. self-preservation).  
See id. 
 149. DeAngelis, supra note 141. 
 150. See supra Part IV.  This is a distrust that the Court recognizes and acknowledges.  See supra 
Parts IV.A, IV.A.1. 
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officers.151 
2. Media’s Influence on Black Americans’ Perception of the Police 
Force 
In August 2019, the Los Angeles Times reported that “[g]etting killed by 
police is a leading cause of death for young black men in America.”152  Seeing 
a headline like this can have devastating effects on Black Americans.153  
However, the media does not only report these disparities through articles.154  
In 1991, a bystander caught four Los Angeles policemen on camera savagely 
beating Rodney King, a Black American man.155  The “graphic video of the 
attack was broadcast into homes across the nation and worldwide.”156  After 
the trial, the police officers were acquitted and “[f]ury over the acquittal—
stoked by years of racial and economic inequality in the city—spilled over 
into the streets, resulting in five days of rioting in Los Angeles.”157  This event 
ignited a national conversation about the police use of force and racial 
disparities in policing—a conversation that very much continues today.158  
According to Jody David Armour, a law professor at the University of 
Southern California, “[t]here was ocular proof of what happened.  It seemed 
compelling. . . . And yet, we saw a verdict that told us we couldn’t trust our 
lying eyes.  That what we thought was open and shut was really ‘a reasonable 
 
 151. See infra Part IV.A.2.  Given the history and current affairs, including an uptick in reporting 
and the media’s amplification of racial disparities, for Black Americans, being nervous or evasive 
before or during an interaction with police officers is oftentimes both normal and reasonable and not 
suggestive of any wrongdoing.  See supra Parts II, IV.A. 
 152. Amina Khan, Getting Killed by Police is a Leading Cause of Death for Young Black Men in 
America, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/science/story/2019-08-15/police-
shootings-are-a-leading-cause-of-death-for-black-men.  Currently, “1 in 1,000 black men and boys in 
America can expect to die at the hands of police.”  Id.  “That 1-in-1,000 number struck us as quite 
high. . . . That’s better odds of being killed by police than you have of winning a lot of scratch-off 
lottery games.”  Id. 
 153. See supra Parts IV.A, IV.A.1.  It can cause trauma, strike fear, and affect the psyche in drastic 
ways.  See supra Parts IV.A, IV.A.1. 
 154. See infra notes 155–156 and accompanying text. 
 155. Anjuli Sastry & Karen Grigsby Bates, When L.A. Erupted in Anger: A Look Back at the Rodney 
King Riots, NPR (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/04/26/524744989/when-la-erupted-in-
anger-a-look-back-at-the-rodney-king-riots. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
[Vol. 48: 223, 2021] Dear Courts 
 PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
249 
expression of police control’ toward a black motorist.”159  The shock and 
disbelief of the verdict led to five days of extreme civil unrest, during which 
Black Americans took to the streets; however, “that shocking, grainy video of 
[Rodney’s] beating would be just the first of a long line of police brutality 
videos to go viral.. . . Ain’t nothing changed but the year it is.”160 
Many videos of police violence against Black Americans gained 
significant media attention and went viral.161  These videos are available all 
over social media, able to be watched frame by frame, in slow motion or fast-
forwarded.162  While these videos work to refute police accounts, reveal 
crucial facts that are often withheld from families of victims and juries, and 
also spark campaigns for justice and reform,163 they also “are so pervasive, 
they inflict a unique harm on viewers, particularly [Black] Americans, who 
see themselves and those they love in these fatal encounters.”164 
Social scientists have been studying “linked fate” in the Black American 
community.165  One study has revealed that in the Black American 
community, “individual life chances are recognized as inextricably tied to the 
race as a whole.”166  Put differently, when Black Americans watch a video that 
exhibits “police violence against another black person, they see themselves or 
their loved ones in that person’s place [and realize] that the same fateful 
encounter could very well happen to them.”.167  This interpretation has been 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Kia Gregory, How Videos of Police Brutality Traumatize African Americans and Undermine 
the Search for Justice, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 13, 2019), https://newrepublic.com/ 
article/153103/videos-police-brutality-traumatize-african-americans-undermine-search-justice.  
These videos included Delrawn Small, an unarmed black man shot and killed by a police officer; Alton 
Sterling, who “died after police in Louisiana tackled and shot him outside the convenience store where 
he was selling CDs”; and Philando Castile, who “was shot and killed by police in Minnesota during a 
traffic stop.”  Id.  More recently, George Floyd, an unarmed Black man, died after a police officer 
restrained him by pressing his knee to Floyd’s neck until his last breath.  Evan Hill et al., How George 
Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html. 
 162. Gregory, supra note 161.  “With the ubiquity of smartphones and dash and body cameras, there 
is ample footage to expose police violence and grab the nation’s attention.  In a virtuallyunlimited 
digital space, the images spread fast and far.”  Id. 
 163. See Gregory, supra note 161. 
 164. See Gregory, supra note 161. 
 165. See Gregory, supra note 161; DeAngelis, supra note 141. 
 166. See Gregory, supra note 161; see also DeAngelis, supra note 141. 
 167. Gregory, supra note 161; see also DeAngelis, supra note 141. 
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proven to induce “stress, fear, frustration, anger, and anxiety, . . . [as well as] 
eating and sleeping disorders, high blood pressure, and heart problems.”168  
Videos like these have been proven to make viewers “start to think differently 
about their world,” specifically that: 
They feel their future is limited, while any symbol of the police can 
impart a sense of fear and dread.  These images “remind them of the 
cheapness of [B]lack life.” . . . This feeling deepens when these 
videos showing violent [B]lack death are treated by the media as 
death porn or perverse entertainment.  “To just have [B]lack bodies 
laying out on the street . . . like roadkill for everybody to see—this is 
dehumanizing and traumatic.”169 
Watching footage of Black Americans repeatedly being subjected to 
police violence can make “viewers so piercingly aware of police violence that 
they instinctively disengage from the police rather than risk facing them.”170  
The videos themselves are not the only source of trauma for Black Americans; 
comments from social media users in response to these videos also reinforce 
this trauma, which is “compounded when videos reveal what seems to be a 
clear case of excessive or unnecessary police force, only for the officers 
involved to not face charges or be acquitted, routinely by a mostly [W]hite 
jury.”171 
The media influences perceptions of law enforcement when individuals 
lack any personal experience with the police.172  Multimedia depictions of 
police corruption and violence have brought widespread awareness that 
implicit racial bias is still alive and well within police departments.173  In fact, 
new technologies have allowed America to chronicle these videos that show, 
“in soul-wrenching detail, the ease with which a [Black] life can be 
 
 168. Gregory, supra note 161; see also DeAngelis, supra note 141. 
 169. Gregory, supra note 161. 
 170. See Gregory, supra note 161. 
 171. See Gregory, supra note 161. 
 172. ANDREW SHELDON FRANKLIN, ROBERT KELVIN PERKINS, MORGAN D. KIRBY & KIJANA P. 
RICHMOND, The Influence of Police Related Media, Victimization, and Satisfaction of African 
American College Students’ Perceptions of Police, FRONTIERS IN SOC. (Sept. 10, 2019), 
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fsoc.2019.00065/full. 
 173. See id. 
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extinguished.”174  Many of these incidents captured on video occur because 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment regarding stop 
and frisks and the reasonable suspicion standard allows police officers to force 
engagements with Black Americans with little or no justification.175  This 
overexposes Black Americans to the possibility of violence.176  In order to not 
further perpetuate these racial disparities in policing at such an alarming rate, 
a recalibration of the reasonable suspicion analysis must be established to 
account for the profoundly distinct experience Black Americans have always 
faced with the police force.177 
V. A TRUE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES ASSESSMENT 
Prior to 2019, courts consistently analyzed reasonable suspicion without 
taking race directly into account.178 This is particularly harmful when 
assessing “nervous or evasive” behavior in the presence of or at the sight of 
officers, and yet utilizing the behavior as a factor to conclude that reasonable 
suspicion exists.179  That assessment of reasonable suspicion discounts the 
Black American experience because it does not account for what history has 
taught Black Americans about the police force and how that affects their 
behavior in the presence of or at the sight of police officers.180  Instead, the 
race-neutral analysis justifies, legitimizes, and perpetuates the racial 
 
 174. Gregory, supra note 161.  Historically, soul-wrenching images were gathered to help support 
“legal reforms against racial discrimination and state violence against [Black] American people.  In 
the 1890s, Ida B. Wells documented lynchings across the United States, publishing statistics and 
details of several dozen of the killings in pamphlets.”  Id.  “During the Civil Rights Movement[], 
photographers captured images of [Black protestors] being attacked by police dogs,” beaten, clubbed, 
fire-hosed, spat on, etc.  Id.  In the wake of these excessive police brutality videos depicting the 
shootings/deaths of many unarmed Black Americans, the Supreme Court should use these videos and 
racial disparity accounts as support for the necessity of legal reform, as the Ninth Circuit has in United 
States v. Brown.  925 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 175. Devon W. Carbado, From Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth 
Amendment Pathways to Police Violence, 105 CAL. L. REV. 125, 127–29 (2017); see also Carpiniello, 
supra note 54, at 356–57 (noting Fourth Amendment law allows the police “to force interactions with 
[Black] Americans”). 
 176. Carbado, supra note 175, at 128–29. 
 177. See infra Part VI. 
 178. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 137 (2000); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
873, 884–86 (1975); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5 (1984); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968); 
see also supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 137. 
 180. See supra Parts III, IV. 
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disparities in policing that are prevalent today.181  To mitigate this racial 
disparity, the Supreme Court should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of 
reasonable suspicion in Brown, and consider the race of the “suspect” in cases 
involving nervous or evasive behavior in the assessment of reasonable 
suspicion.182  Otherwise, the reasonable suspicion standard will continue to 
facilitate and justify “the ‘wholesale harassment’ of [B]lack communities” 
recognized in the majority opinion in Terry.183 
A. Race in the Assessment of Reasonable Suspicion 
In order for courts to play a role in mitigating perpetuated racial 
disparities in policing,  courts cannot ignore race as a factor in their policies.184  
The courts must be rigorous in reviewing police stops, arrests, and other 
physically aggressive encounters with civilians—Black Americans in 
particular—otherwise, the courts become complicit in affirming the 
aggressive tactics used by the police.185  Courts have stated themselves that 
civilians have a right to avoid the police and go about their business.186  Yet, 
these same courts often undermine that notion by finding that because a 
suspect is engaged in some type of nervous or evasive behavior, the individual 
must be manifesting a consciousness of guilt.187 
The Supreme Court has recognized that “the determination of reasonable 
suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about 
human behavior.”188  When race is assessed in the analysis of reasonable 
suspicion, the link between flight and consciousness of guilt becomes slight.189  
A Black American’s nervous or evasive behavior in the presence of the police 
 
 181. See supra Part IV. 
 182. See United States v. Brown, 925 F.3d 1150, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 2019); see also supra Parts III, 
IV. 
 183. See Carbado, From Stop and Frisk, supra note 51, at 1537. 
 184. See supra Parts III, IV. 
 185. See supra Part IV. 
 186. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983); see also Smith v. United States, 558 
A.2d 312, 316 (D.C. 1989). 
 187. See Henning, supra note 89 at 85; see infra notes 188192 and accompanying text. 
 188. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000). 
 189. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 925 F.3d 1150, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Wardlow, 
528 U.S. at 128–29 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting there are numerous reasons an innocent person 
may flee from a police officer); see also supra Part IV (describing how the Black American experience 
causes flight from the police even when innocent). 
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is just as likely to be a protective measure to avoid police violence as it is to 
result from consciousness of guilt.190  Black Americans who live in a society 
where police-on-Black violence has always been commonplace have many 
reasons to be nervous or exhibit evasive behavior in the presence of or at the 
sight of the police.191  When courts take race directly into account in a Fourth 
Amendment reasonable suspicion assessment, as the Ninth Circuit did in 
Brown, it should significantly negate any inference that a Black American’s 
nervous or evasive behavior with police officers manifests a consciousness of 
guilt; more importantly, it shows Black Americans that the courts see their 
experience, and that it is not irrelevant, but it matters.192 
B. Recalibrating the Assessment of Fourth Amendment Reasonable 
Suspicion 
When assessing Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion, the courts 
should consider the race of the individual as a factor, especially when 
analyzing the individual’s behavior.193  The Supreme Court has mandated, in 
evaluating whether reasonable suspicion exists, the necessity of examining the 
“totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.”194  However, the Court has 
found that race-specific reasons for flight are not relevant in determining 
reasonable suspicion.195  By discounting Black Americans’ race-specific 
reasons for nervous or evasive behavior, the Court is using only a limited—or 
convenient—totality of the circumstances analysis, because oftentimes those 
race-specific reasons are a significant part of “the whole picture.”196  This 
race-specific analysis would force the Court to account for—and not 
disregard—the distinctly unique experience of Black Americans in interacting 
 
 190. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 630 n.4 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (recognizing 
that the idea that only the guilty flee fails to account for minority citizens and capture the total reality 
of our world).  This point was  reiterated in Wardlow.  See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 129  n.3 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 191. See supra Parts II, III.B. 
 192. See infra Part V.B. 
 193. See infra notes 194–197. 
 194. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126–27 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra note 88 and accompanying 
text. 
 195. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125–26 (holding that potential innocent reasons for flight in general 
are not enough to constitute a Fourth Amendment violation). 
 196. See supra Parts II, IV. 
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with police officers.197 
In Brown, had the court disregarded the race of the “suspect” in its 
assessment of reasonable suspicion, flight would have “carr[ied] the day in 
authorizing a stop.”198  However, the court rightfully recognized that Brown 
was a Black American man and in analyzing that fact, the court considered 
his motivation as a fleeing Black person and analyzed whether or not that 
could be seen as reasonable—i.e., it asked how a reasonable Black American 
would react under the circumstances.199  Race is an important factor in this 
analysis because Black Americans have “unique reactions to police 
encounters based on the reality of their experience on the streets of 
America.”200  When courts consider how race might have influenced a Black 
American’s attitude towards a police encounter, the court becomes not only 
more understanding, but also more aware of the cultural differences which 
promulgate disparate treatment in society.201  Using a color-blind analysis in 
evaluating whether reasonable suspicion exists in a certain instance ignores 
and dehumanizes the Black American experience and how that experience 
predictably causes Black Americans to react uniquely—albeit reasonably, in 
light of that experience—when interacting with the police.202 
This proposal, calling for the recalibration of the reasonable suspicion 
assessment, is not proposing that Black Americans be treated differently when 
encountering the police.203  Rather, this Comment proposes that the Court take 
particularized observations of an individual into account and consider those 
observations within the norms of that individual’s community; more 
importantly, it asks the Court not to discount that experience.204  A true totality 
of the circumstances analysis must look at the whole picture.205  A race-
specific analysis in the assessment of reasonable suspicion would ensure that 
 
 197. See Carpiniello, supra note 54, at 369; see also United States v. Brown, 925 F.3d 1150, 1156–
57 (2019) (accounting for the fact that the defendant was a Black American—and how that might have 
an effect on his behavior—significantly negated the inference that the defendant engaged in flight 
because he was guilty). 
 198. Brown, 925 F.3d at 1156–57. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Carpiniello, supra note 54, at 378. 
 201. See supra Parts II, IV. 
 202. See supra Part V. 
 203. See infra notes 204–210. 
 204. See Carpiniello, supra note 54 at 378. 
 205. See United States v. Brown, 925 F.3d 1150, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 2019). 
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the Black American experience is seen and accounted for.206  Black Americans 
are disproportionately targeted by the police and burdened with concerns of 
police surveillance, social control, and violence.207  Multimedia platforms, 
from social networks to the twenty-four hour news cycle, reinforce the idea 
that race exposes Black Americans to these concerns.208  Making race one of 
the contextual factors in a reasonable suspicion assessment would account for 
the individual’s reasonable perception of the police, beyond the mere analysis 
of the individual’s behavior.209  This true totality of the circumstances analysis 
will make reviewing police stops, arrests, and other physically aggressive 
encounters with civilians more rigorous; this, in turn, will mitigate 
disproportionate policing in America while also working to heal Black 
American culture from the traumatizing effects that this history of 
disproportionate policing has caused.210 
VI. THE IMPACT OF ASSESSING RACE 
Judicial reform of the reasonable suspicion assessment of the Fourth 
Amendment would require the courts to consider the race of the suspect in 
interpreting the suspect’s behavior.211  This would negate the inference of 
consciousness of guilt that is usually associated with nervous or evasive 
behavior in the presence of police officers.212 
Evidence has repeatedly shown that police departments such as the 
NYPD ha[ve] employed stop-and-frisk practices to engage in prophylactic 
racial profiling.”213  Black Americans are overrepresented in jails and prisons 
 
 206. See, e.g., id. at 1156, 1159. 
 207. See supra Part IV.2. 
 208. See supra Part IV. 
 209. See, e.g., Brown, 925 F.3d at 1156, 1159. 
 210. See supra Parts III, IV. 
 211. See Henning, supra note 89, at 85.  This new assessment is of particular importance when the 
Court is analyzing the behaviors of the suspect and concludes that nervous or evasive behavior weighs 
in favor of finding justifiable, reasonable suspicion.  See supra Part V. 
 212. See Henning, supra note 89, at 85.  For example, “[a] [B]lack child’s flight from the police is 
[a] clear example of how race and age might negate inference of guilt.”  Id. at 86.  “Flight may be 
imminently reasonable for an adolescent who is impulsive and often does not engage in the same 
commonsense judgments and behaviors as adults. . . . When we add race to adolescent indiscretions, 
the link between flight and consciousness of guilt becomes even more tenuous.”  Id. 
 213. Carbado, From Stop and Frisk, supra note 51, at 1537.  From January 2004 to June 2012, the 
NYPD “conducted over 4.4 million Terry stops. . . . Blacks and Latinos were the subjects of 83 percent 
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relative to numbers in the general population.214  Racial disparities in policing 
present irrefutable evidence that police officers are much more likely to stop 
a Black American.215  This practice has, in effect, created the justified belief 
that because Black Americans are more frequent targets of police stops, and 
thus, more frequent targets of undesirable treatment by the police force, they 
are more likely to be nervous or evasive at the sight of or during an interaction 
with the police force.216  Black Americans try to avoid the police, who have a 
legacy of extreme actions, including harassment and beatings.217  The Court’s 
use of a more rigorous standard—taking race into account in the contextual 
analysis of reasonable suspicion—would have a positive impact on the racial 
disparities in policing as well as work to heal relations between Black 
Americans and the police force.218 
Mitigating or negating the inference that a Black American’s nervous or 
evasive behavior manifests a consciousness of guilt would have the effect of 
limiting police contact with the Black American community—likely reducing 
it down to as much contact as police have with any other racial group.219  This 
recalibration of the reasonable suspicion assessment would lead to a reduction 
of police violence, arrests, and incarceration among Black Americans.220  That 
reduction would show Black Americans that the law recognizes their unique 
experience and, at the very least, takes it into consideration.221  A true totality 
 
of the 4.4 million stops. . . . The NYPD frisked 52 percent of the people they stopped.  Police found 
weapons on 1.0 percent of the [B]lacks they frisked . . . . [T]he NYPD did not find weapons on 98.5 
percent of the roughly 2.3 million people they frisked.”  Id. at 1538. 
 214. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 124; see supra Part IV. 
 215. See supra Part IV. 
 216. See supra Parts II, IV. 
 217. See supra Part IV.A. 
 218. See Russell-Brown, supra note 131, at 137–38.  Because this is a more rigorous standard, it 
would hold officers accountable in justifying their articulable reasonable suspicion with less of the 
implicit bias that “influences individual actors within the justice system.”  Id.  “[Implicit bias] has 
been identified as an inroad to understanding racial disparity that persists across the justice system 
continuum, including arrest, bail decisions, prosecutorial charging decisions, jury selection, 
sentencing, and parole.”  Id. 
 219. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in 
Terry Stops in Street Policing, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 51, 70–85 (2015) (analyzing the specific stop 
circumstances and the percentage of stops based on each factor in the reasonable suspicion 
assessment). 
 220. See supra Part IV. 
 221. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126–27 (2000).  The totality of the circumstances analysis 
is set to provide the full picture.  Id.  However, not analyzing the race of a person who decides or 
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of the circumstances analysis reflects upon the whole picture—every detail of 
the situation—and how that may affect what transpired.222  Thus, a true totality 
of the circumstance analysis takes race into account.223 
Similarly, public policy decisions appear to be “race-neutral” on the 
surface; however, many of them undoubtedly have racially biased outcomes 
due to policymakers’ failure to analyze the unintended impacts of policies that 
were developed in the name of “public safety.”224  An example would be the 
drug-free school zone laws.225  While these policies were adopted with the 
goal of deterring drug sales on school grounds, in general, there are harsher 
penalties for drug offenses committed within a designated school zone.226  
“One of the many problems with such policies is that individuals can be 
subjected to these penalties even if they had no knowledge that they were 
within the school zone district.”227  Policymakers often presuppose the 
“heavy-handed law enforcement approach is the only, or most effective, 
means of responding” to violations in communities of color; however, such 
policies “implicitly reject[] policy responses that might prioritize creating 
economic opportunity, improving educational outcomes, expanding substance 
abuse treatment centers, or other measures.”228 
 
unconsciously acts in a nervous or evasive way is leaving out part of that picture.  See id.; supra Parts 
III, VI. 
 222. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126–127.  This very reason is why the “state of mind” of the defendant 
is very important in criminal cases because it affects the defendant’s responsibility for a crime.  
Criminal Resource Manual, Culpable States of Mind, DEP’T OF JUSTICE ARCHIVES, 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-1510-culpable-states-mind-18-usc-
1028 (last visited Aug. 29, 2020).  Assessing race in the totality of the circumstances analysis explores 
the state of mind of a Black American who exhibits nervous or evasive behavior and works to 
understand its reasonableness in light of the whole picture.  See also supra Part IV.A. 
 223. See supra Parts III, IV, –V. 
 224. Marc Mauer, The Endurance of Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System, in POLICING 
THE BLACK MAN 31, 46 (Angela J. Davis ed. 2017).  “Many of these effects can be seen in policies 
adopted through the war on drugs in recent decades.  At the level of policing, a wealth of evidence, 
generally acknowledged by law enforcement leadership, has documented that drug law enforcement 
has disproportionately focused on communities of color.”  Id. 
 225. Id. at 48–49. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 49. 
 228. Id.  One example is the mandatory penalties for crack cocaine offenses that were enacted by 
Congress in 1986. 
[L]egislation was adopted in record time, with virtually no discussion about approaches to 
the problem other than harsh penalties.  Here, too, the racial imagery was inescapable.  As 
portrayed on the cover of news magazines and other media, “the problem” was identified 
 
[Vol. 48: 223, 2021] Dear Courts 
 PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
258 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Amendment is often lauded as one of the Constitution’s 
greatest protections of individual liberty229: it codifies the belief that 
individuals are allowed—as a fundamental right—to live their lives free from 
unreasonable police intervention.230  Inherent in that belief is the idea that an 
individual should be able to walk down the street without fear of being 
stopped by the police without cause.231  That protection of individual liberty, 
however, “has been stripped from millions of Americans” due to the Court’s 
creation of the overly lax reasonable suspicion standard, and its failure to 
recognize and account for the Black American experience.232 
The Ninth Circuit correctly recognized that the nervous or evasive 
behavior of a Black American in the presence of or at the sight of a police 
officer does not always suggest that the person has something to hide.233  The 
court did not discount the race of the “suspect,” and, by taking race into 
account, the court recognized that Black Americans have many reasons—
drawn from inferences and common sense judgments—to act in a nervous or 
evasive way in the presence of the police.234  It recognized that the history of 
the police force’s aggressive tactics in marginalizing Black Americans, along 
with the increase in the reporting of these tactics via multimedia platforms 
such as the twenty-four hour news cycle, newspaper articles, and social media, 
have created not only a culture of fear, distrust, and resentment toward the 
police force among Black Americans, but also have had an effect on the Black 
American psyche.235  These effects include transgenerational trauma and the 
idea of a linked fate, which understandably caused Black Americans to feel 
nervous or to exude evasive behaviors in the presence of or at the sight of 
police officers because that was how history and current affairs advised them 
 
as one of [B]lack men using and selling crack.  As a consequence, the penalties adopted 
for crack cocaine offenses—80 percent of which were applied to [Black] Americans—were 
far more punitive than those for powder cocaine, a drug more widely used by whites and 
Latinos. 
Id. 
 229. Henning, supra note 89, at 85. 
 230. Henning, supra note 89, at 85. 
 231. Henning, supra note 89, at 85. 
 232. Henning, supra note 89, at 85. 
 233. See supra notes 88–100 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra Part III.B. 
 235. See supra Parts II, IV, V. 
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to act.236 
The Supreme Court should adopt the more rigorous standard of assessing 
race in its totality of the circumstances analysis of reasonable suspicion.237  
This new standard would mitigate the policing disparities in America today 
and work to slowly mend the relationship between Black Americans and the 
police force.238  The Court should also acknowledge the distinct experience 
that Black Americans face with regard to the police force and recognize its 
relevance to the American criminal justice system.239  In sum, the Black 
American experience must be seen by the American criminal justice system, 
starting with the courts.240 
Marvel L. Faulkner 
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